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federal Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g) programs.1 Both have been
challenged on constitutional preemption and equal protection grounds.2
Recent scholarship has focused mainly on whether the state and local actions
are constitutionally preempted.3 Current scholarship has overlooked ways the
federal government has previously utilized state and local entities to enforce
federal laws that govern individual rights.4 For example, the landmark case
Prigg v. Pennsylvania held that the federal government could not confer power
to the states to implement the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act.5 Prigg declared that
the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act and the Constitution’s Fugitive Slave Clause
provided the exclusive remedy for the return of runaway slaves.6 This case
provides a normative and prescriptive response to contemporary debates about
immigration federalism at a time when state and local governments are
enacting their own immigration legislation due to federal inaction.
This Article uses legal history to understand the enforcement of immigration
law and policy. This discussion began with immigration scholar Gerald
Neuman’s 1993 article, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law,
(1776-1875).7 Neuman claimed, “ignoring the early history of immigration

1. Compare S.B. 1070, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450 (codified in scattered sections of ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. (2011)), and HB56, 2011 Ala. Acts 535, with 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006).
2. United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (N.D. Ala. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, and dismissed in part, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Arizona, 703 F.
Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and
remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
3. See, e.g., Anil Kalhan, Immigration Enforcement and Federalism After September 11,
2001, in IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION, AND SECURITY: EUROPE AND AMERICA IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 181–82 (Ariane Chebel d’Appolonia & Simon Reich eds., 2008), available at
http://works.bepress.com/anil_kalhan/3; Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local
Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 27, 53 (2007); Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty
and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1376–77, 1391–95 (2006);
Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 567, 620–28 (2008); Tiffany Walters Kleinert, Comment, Local and State Enforcement of
Immigration Law: An Equal Protection Analysis, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1103, 1106–10 (2006).
4. But see Paul Finkelman, Fugitive Slaves, Midwestern Racial Tolerance, and the Value
of “Justice Delayed”, 78 IOWA L. REV. 89, 99 (1992) (discussing the difficulties in drawing too
close a historical parallel between immigration and the Fugitive Slave Acts, but noting that
“[r]eturning to slavery meant breaking up families, depriving mortgage holders of full payment,
and destroying the continuity and harmony of a community.”); see also Craig B. Mousin, A Clear
View from the Prairie: Harold Washington and the People of Illinois Respond to Federal
Encroachment of Human Rights, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 285, 287–88 (2005) (examining how “Chicago
precedent of prohibiting local police from cooperating with federal officials in enforcing the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 . . . provide[s] insight into city government’s role, if any, when
Congress requires local law enforcement to control movement of people.”).
5. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 625–26 (1842).
6. Id.
7. Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law, (1776-1875), 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1834 (1993) (examining the states’ early role in regulating immigration).
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regulation impairs constitutional understandings of the scope and character of
federal immigration power, and of the way in which this power is distributed
between Congress and the President.”8 Recently, Professor Kerry Abrams
argued that the 1875 Page Act was the country’s first restrictive federal
immigration law.9 Abrams also reviewed early state restrictions and noted that
California “compared the immigration of ‘persons incompetent to become
citizens’ with immigration of free blacks. If the state police power gave
Southern states the authority to restrict the migration of free blacks, the logic
went, why could not California restrict the migration of the Chinese?”10
This article furthers the Neuman and Abrams analyses, arguing that we
should look back further to the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act to understand how the
Act brought about the passing of the Equal Protection Clause and how current
immigration enforcement policies can abrogate individual rights. Using these
articles as a starting point, this Article explores the similarities between the
current immigration enforcement policies and the Fugitive Slave Acts.
To date, legal scholars have not engaged in this comparison.11 Legal
historians who have examined the Fugitive Slave Acts have done so in the
context of their constitutional foundations.12 These historians, however, have
not explored how the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Acts relates to
contemporary federal enforcement of immigration laws, perhaps because, as
Professor Daniel Kanstroom wrote, “the repugnant but consistent classification
of fugitive slave cases as matters of property renders comparison with the
Neuman also encouraged others to explore regulation of immigration preceding 1875. Id. at
1840.
8. Id. at 1834–35.
9. Kerry Abrams, The Hidden Dimension of Nineteenth-Century Immigration Law, 6
VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1355 (2009) [hereinafter Abrams, Hidden Dimension] (arguing that
conceptualizations of pre-1875 immigration law should be expanded to include intra-state and
state-to-territory migration); Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of
Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 645–647 (2005) [hereinafter Abrams, Polygamy]
(arguing for the inclusion of the 1875 Page Law in understanding immigration federalism).
10. Abrams, Polygamy, supra note 9, at 673 (footnote omitted).
11. But see Mousin, supra note 4, at 292.
12. See Paul Finkelman, John McLean: Moderate Abolitionist and Supreme Court
Politician, 62 VAND. L. REV. 519, 543 (2009) [hereinafter Finkelman, John McLean]; see also
Paul Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 605, 621 (1993)
[hereinafter Finkelman, Prigg]; Paul Finkelman, The Kidnapping of John Davis and the Adoption
of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, 56 J. S. HIST. 397, 397 (1990); Robert J. Kaczorowski, The
Supreme Court and Congress’s Power to Enforce Constitutional Rights: An Overlooked Moral
Anomaly, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 153, 157 (2004) [hereinafter Kaczorowski, Moral Anomaly]
(“[S]cholarly studies of the Fugitive Slave Clause and the Fugitive Slave Acts have focused on
the ways this area of federal law was antithetical to the constitutional liberties of the tragic
individuals it assisted slave owners to return to slavery.”); Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Tragic
Irony of American Federalism: National Sovereignty Versus State Sovereignty in Slavery and in
Freedom, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1015, 1023–25 (1997) [hereinafter Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony]
(collecting important full-length legal histories on fugitive slave laws at 1027 n.57); Anthony J.
Sebok, Judging the Fugitive Slave Acts, 100 YALE L.J. 1835, 1835–36 (1991).
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deportation system difficult.”13 Outside the field of law, scholar and journalist
Robert Lovato has alleged that the Fugitive Slave Acts mirror federal
immigration enforcement programs such as Secure Our Communities
Programs and Agreements of Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety
and Security (ACCESS).14 Lovato argues, “[f]ederal laws that allowed local
and state authorities to pursue blacks under the Fugitive Slave Act appear to be
the model for the Bush Administration’s [ACCESS] program, which allows
states to deputize law enforcement officials to chase, detain, arrest and jail the
undocumented.”15
This Article challenges the notion of the Fugitive Slave Acts’ irrelevance by
examining in detail the similarities of both systems and the results that are
produced when the federal government is provided with unfettered discretion
to abrogate individual rights.16 This Article also contributes to a growing body
of scholarship analyzing the role of African American slavery and pre-1875
immigration history in our conceptualization of the U.S. immigration system.
Several scholars have already called for the inclusion of the early forced
migration patterns of African Americans as part of our conceptualization of
immigration history.17
13. DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 81
(2010); see also Neuman, supra note 7, at 1837 n.18 (providing reasons against reframing
immigration law to place slavery at its origin because slavery was involuntary, enslaved people
were deemed less than fully human, and the concerns that viewing slavery as immigration may be
“euphemistic”).
14. Roberto Lovato, Juan Crow in Georgia, THE NATION, May 26, 2008, at 20, 21,
available at http://www.thenation.com/article/juan-crow-georgia.
15. Id.
16. See Rhonda V. MaGee, Slavery as Immigration?, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 273, 287 (2009)
(citing Walter Berns, The Constitution and the Migration of Slaves, 78 YALE L.J. 198, 200
(1968)).
As Bilder has shown, slavery was not merely a degrading, exploitative economic
system, legal status assignment, and existential condition. Rather it was also a means
of transporting men and women from Africa and the diaspora into the colonies and
slave-importing southern states. In other words, slavery was “both a labor relationship
and a way of moving people” from one national landscape to another. Enslaved people
were “simultaneously individuals who increased population and a pool of bound labor.”
Id. (quoting Mary Sarah Bilder, The Struggle over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and
Articles of Commerce, 61 MO. L. REV. 743, 761 (1996) (footnotes omitted)).
17. See, e.g., id. at 274 (analyzing the forced migration of African Americans through the
trans-Atlantic slave trade). Legal scholars and historians have advocated for the inclusion of the
trans-Atlantic slave trade in the United States’ current immigration and human trafficking
policies. See Karen E. Bravo, Exploring the Analogy Between Modern Trafficking in Humans
and the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 207, 211–12 (2007); see also Karen
Bravo, Free Labor! A Labor Liberalization Solution to Modern Trafficking in Humans, 18
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 545, 569–70 (2009) [hereinafter Bravo, Free Labor]. In
addition, some scholars use the forced migration of slaves to challenge the notion that early
American history contained no immigration policy. MaGee, supra note 16, at 297 (citing Gabriel
J. Chin, Chae Chan Ping & Fong Yue Ting, The Origins of Plenary Power, in IMMIGRATION
STORIES 7 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005)); id. at 276 (“[C]hattel slavery was,
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This examination addresses three main thematic questions: (1) how can
social norms embedded in laws create a system that perpetuates tiered
personhood?; (2) how has the federal government’s action or inaction spurred
state and local action that violates individual rights?; and (3) does acceptance
of anti-immigrant laws reinforce divisive cultural norms that prevent
integration of immigrants of color?18
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview of the
implementation and enforcement of the Constitution’s Fugitive Slave Clause
and the 1793 and 1850 Fugitive Slave Acts. This Part also explores the
implementation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and
the evisceration of the Fugitive Slave Acts when subsequent immigration laws
refused to recognize equal protection rights for immigrants. Part II explores
the reverse immigration-federalism story in which states and localities are
enacting immigration legislation against the backdrop of federal inaction. Part
III explores how both the Fugitive Slave Acts and current immigration
enforcement laws create outsiders by failing to protect individual liberty rights.
The Article concludes with broad doctrinal lessons on immigration federalism
and demonstrates how the law and legal actors can perpetuate norms that
facilitate the creation of tiered personhood.
I. COMPARING THE FUGITIVE SLAVE ACTS AND PRIGG V. PENNSYLVANIA’S
CONTRIBUTION TO IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY
A. 1789 Fugitive Slave Clause and the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act
During the Constitution’s drafting, the Fugitive Slave Clause was added as a
compromise between the northern and southern states.19 The clause provided:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but
shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or
Labour may be due.20
among very many other things, a compulsory form of immigration, the protection and regulation
of which, under federal and state law, was our nation’s first system of ‘immigration law.’ As a
consequence, the formal system that developed was inculcated with the notion of a permanent,
quasi-citizen-worker underclass and privileged white ethnics under naturalization law—its
legacies we can see up to the present day.”). MaGee criticizes the omission of African
Americans’ migration to the United States and alleges that the trans-Atlantic slave trade was
“among the most significant historical antecedents of contemporary immigration law and policy,
with legacies that reverberate through immigration law and policy in the United States up to the
present day.” Id. at 274–75.
18. Karla Mari McKanders, Sustaining Tiered Personhood: Jim Crow and Anti-Immigrant
Laws, 26 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 163, 170–71 (2010).
19. THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH
1780–1861, at 16–17 (1974).
20. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII).
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According to Robert J. Kaczorowski, the Clause codified the common law
right of reception, which “authorized the owner of chattel, such as livestock [or
slaves] . . . , that strayed or were taken away, to recover them through
self-help, provided it could be done without a breach of the peace.”21 Thus, the
Fugitive Slave Clause permitted the federal government to resolve conflicts
amongst the states by enforcing the right of slave owners to retrieve their
fleeing property.22 The Supreme Court eventually affirmed this grant of
power, noting that “if, indeed, the Constitution guarantees the right . . . the
natural inference certainly is, that the national government is clothed with the
appropriate authority and functions to enforce it.”23
In order to make the Fugitive Slave Clause operational, Congress passed the
Fugitive Slave Act in 1793 (1793 Act).24 The 1793 Act provided a process to
return fugitive slaves, as well as penalties for those who obstructed their
rendition.25 Slave owners and their agents had a cause of action to enforce
their constitutionally secured right of reception in private lawsuits brought in
federal and state courts under the 1793 Act.26 Their efforts were often
successful as “[s]lave-owners and their agents brought many civil suits under
the 1793 statute, and they succeeded in recovering the civil fine and tort
damages more often than they failed.”27
The removal process under the 1793 Act involved several steps: (1) the
fugitive slave was seized or arrested; (2) the slave owner took the slave before
a judge or magistrate in any state or federal court;28 (3) upon proof the official
issued a certificate authorizing removal of the fugitive slave from the state; and
(4) a penalty of a fine or jail time was imposed if a person had or attempted to
obstruct or hinder rights under the Act.29 The seized fugitive slave “was not
entitled to a trial by jury, was not guaranteed the right to testify, and oral
testimony was [only] permitted to prove the claim of ownership.”30 There was
no statute of limitation on claims under the Fugitive Slave Act, making the fear
of recapture indefinite.31
21. Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony, supra note 12, at 1024.
22. Id. at 1025.
23. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 615 (1842); see also Kaczorowski, The
Tragic Irony, supra note 12, at 1025 (explaining the significance of the Fugitive Slave Clause).
24. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 302, 302–05 (1845); see also Kaczorowski, The
Tragic Irony, supra note 12, at 1025 (“Congress exercised plenary power under the Fugitive
Slave Clause when it enacted a statute to enforce it.”).
25. Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony, supra note 12, at 1026.
26. Id. at 1027; see also Act of Feb. 12, 1793, § 3, 1 Stat. at 302–05.
27. Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony, supra note 12, at 1027; see also id. at 1027 n.58
(collecting cases).
28. MORRIS, supra note 19, at 21.
29. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, § 3, 1 Stat. at 302–05.
30. Morgan Cloud, Quakers, Slaves and the Founders: Profiling to Save the Union, 73
MISS. L.J. 369, 401 (2003) (citing Act of Feb. 12, 1793, § 3, 1 Stat. at 305).
31. Id. at 401–02.
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The 1793 Act proved ineffective for three reasons: (1) the reluctance of local
officers to enforce the provisions; (2) the underlying moral conflict between
the northern and southern states regarding slavery; and (3) the constitutionality
of the Act.32 In addition, “[a]s federal judges were rather scarce at the time, the
implementation of this law was often quite inefficient, inconvenient, and
dangerous. The law did not authorize the issuance of warrants, nor did it allow
federal marshals to aid in the pursuit and capture of fugitives.”33
Many cases brought under the 1793 Act were actions in tort against persons
who harbored or concealed fugitive slaves.34 Anyone who helped fugitive
slaves abscond would be subject to a $500 fine.35 Despite their personal views
to the contrary and the lack of uniformity in state law on the issue, “antebellum
state and federal judges felt obligated to enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause and
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.”36 For example, in Jones v. Van Zandt, the
plaintiff, a citizen from Kentucky, brought an action against the defendant, a
citizen from Ohio, for harboring and concealing fugitive slaves.37 Jones
alleged that Van Zandt knew the persons were fugitive slaves yet concealed
them.38 Van Zandt claimed that he lacked notice that the persons he helped
were fugitive slaves39 and argued that, in order to be fined, proper notice was
required.40 The Supreme Court found that verbal notice or acts evidencing
knowledge of the fugitive slave’s status was enough to establish requisite
notice.41 Further, the Court found that an overt act intended to “elude the
vigilance of the master or his agent, and which is calculated to attain such an
object is a harboring.”42
B. State Personal Liberty Laws
Between 1780 and 1861, northern states passed personal liberty laws, some
in response to the 1793 Act.43 Personal liberty laws were intended to interfere
with slave owners’ efforts to recapture slaves as well as protect free blacks and

32. Charles A. Lindquist, The Origin and Development of the United States Commissioner
System, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 7 (1970) (quoting HOMER S. CUMMINGS & CARL
MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL
EXECUTIVE 175 (1937)); see also Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony, supra note 12, at 1027–30.
33. KANSTROOM, supra note 13, at 78.
34. Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony, supra note 12, at 1026–27.
35. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, § 3, 1 Stat. at 302–05.
36. Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony, supra note 12, at 1027–28; see also id. at 1028 n.60
(collecting several cases displaying this dichotomy).
37. Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215, 217 (1847).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 225.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 231–32.
42. Id. at 232.
43. MORRIS, supra note 19, at x–xi.
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fugitive slaves from fugitive slave laws.44 The northern states wanted alleged
fugitive slaves to have due process rights and a presumption of freedom.45
Pennsylvania was at the forefront of enacting state laws to prevent the
enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act.46 The Pennsylvania law stated that if
any person attempted to remove a “negro or mulatto” from the state with the
intention of enslaving him or her, that person would be guilty of a felony, fined
up to $3,000, and sentenced to hard labor.47 Moreover, Pennsylvania
considered children born to fugitive slaves while in the state to be free.48
Vermont and New York passed personal liberty laws during the 1840s.49
These laws gave those accused as fugitive slaves the right to trial by jury and
the right to an attorney.50 Connecticut and Indiana also provided trial by jury
on appeal.51 Connecticut’s early protective statutes, although employing
language in the preamble favoring the return of fugitive slaves, fined state
officials who took part in fugitive slave cases.52

44. MARION GLEASON MCDOUGALL, FUGITIVE SLAVES (1619-1865), at 65 (1891).
45. Id.; see also MORRIS, supra note 19, at 12 (describing the revisions northern states made
to their state laws).
When the federal government refused to assert a right to eliminate gradually the
property interest in human beings, most antislavery people in the free states saw little
alternative but to try to separate sharply slavery and freedom at both the state and
federal levels, and to assure that those who were free would not be deprived of their
personal liberty.
MORRIS, supra note 19, at 24.
46. Edward Raymond Turner, The Abolition of Slavery in Pennsylvania, 36 PA. MAG. HIST.
& BIOGRAPHY 129, 129 (1912), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/20085586.
47. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 539 (1842). The personal liberty statute
provided
that if any person or persons shall from and after the passing of the act, by force or
violence take and carry away, or cause to be taken and carried away, and shall by fraud
or false pretense, seduce, or cause to be seduced, or shall attempt to take, carry away, or
seduce any negro or mulatto from any part of that commonwealth, with a design and
intention of selling and disposing of, or causing to be sold, or of keeping and detaining,
or of causing to be kept and detained, such negro or mulatto, as a slave or servant for
life, or for any term whatsoever; every such person or persons, his or their aiders or
abettors, shall, on conviction thereof, be deemed guilty of felony, and shall forfeit and
pay a sum not less than five hundred, nor more than one thousand dollars; and
moreover, shall be sentenced to undergo a servitude for any term or terms of years, not
less than seven years nor exceeding twenty-one years; and shall be confined and kept to
hard labour . . . .
Id. at 608.
48. PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 65
(1981).
49. MCDOUGALL, supra note 44, at 66.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 65.
52. Id. at 65–66.
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In the South, South Carolina passed its Declaration of the Causes of
Secession in 1860.53 In this declaration, the state noted that “fourteen of the
States have deliberately refused for years past to fulfill their constitutional
obligations, and we refer to their own statutes for the proof.”54 In response,
Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio posited, “[c]annot a sovereign State of this
Union prevent the kidnapping of her free citizens because you have a right to
claim a slave fleeing from service?”55 Previously, the northern states took
“positive action to remove the internal legal principles built upon the
assumption that a person could be considered a thing.”56 This led to a schism
on the Mason/Dixon Line57 and raised an issue of comity amongst states.58
C. Prigg v. Pennsylvania and the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act
Prigg v. Pennsylvania was the main case challenging federal and state action
under the 1793 Act.59 In 1832, Edward Prigg, a professional slave catcher,
seized Margaret Morgan, a black woman, whose former owner, John Ashmore,
let her live virtually free in Maryland despite never formally emancipating
her.60 Because Morgan’s parents were informally emancipated, “Morgan grew
up thinking she was free and had always lived as a free woman in Maryland.”61
Thereafter, she moved to Pennsylvania, married a freeborn black man, and had
children.62 At least one of the children was born in Pennsylvania.63
Ashmore’s heirs wanted Morgan returned as a slave and sent Prigg to
capture her in Pennsylvania.64 The state refused to return Morgan because
Prigg failed to comply with its personal liberty statute.65 Prigg applied to a
state magistrate for certificates of removal, invoking the federal Fugitive Slave
Act of 1793.66 These certificates would allow Prigg to remove Morgan to
Maryland legally.67 When Prigg could not obtain the certificates, he took

53. MORRIS, supra note 19, at 1.
54. DECLARATION OF THE IMMEDIATE CAUSES WHICH INDUCE AND JUSTIFY THE
SECESSION OF SOUTH CAROLINA FROM THE FEDERAL UNION 7 (1860).
55. CONG. GLOBE APP., 36TH, 1ST SESS. 152 (1860).
56. MORRIS, supra note 19, at 7.
57. Id. at 8.
58. Id. at 13–14.
59. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
60. Id. at 608–09.
61. Finkelman, John Mclean, supra note 12, at 544–45.
62. Id.
63. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 609.
64. Finkelman, Prigg, supra note 12, at 611.
65. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 608–09; THOMAS H. TALBOT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
RESPECTING FUGITIVES FROM SERVICE OR LABOR, AND THE ACT OF CONGRESS, OF SEPTEMBER
18, 1850, at 29 (1852).
66. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 609.
67. See Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 302, 302–05 (1845).
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Morgan and her children to Maryland in violation of Pennsylvania law.68
What ensued was a long battle between Pennsylvania’s personal liberty laws
and the Ashmore heirs’ ability to remove Morgan to Maryland as a slave under
the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act.69 Pennsylvania indicted Prigg, who pled not
guilty,70 and the state requested his extradition from Maryland.71 Upon Prigg’s
return, he was convicted for violating Pennsylvania’s personal liberty law.72
Following his conviction, he appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.73
The Court considered two issues in Prigg. First, the Court considered
whether the power to legislate under the Fugitive Slave Clause of the
Constitution resided with the federal government or the states.74 Second, the
Court considered whether federal law could oblige state officials to execute
federal fugitive-slave law.75 Pennsylvania argued its law was based on the
police powers that the Tenth Amendment secured.76
The Court held that the 1793 Act’s attempt to confer state magistrates
jurisdiction over fugitive slaves was unconstitutional.77 Specifically, the
Supreme Court Justices found that Congress had exclusive jurisdiction over
fugitive slaves and that only federal courts could enforce rights under the 1793
Act.78 Legal scholar Paul Finkelman succinctly described the Court’s holding
as stating “that while state officials ought to enforce the federal Fugitive Slave
Act, Congress could not obligate them to do so because Congress did not pay
their salaries.”79
Justice Story’s majority opinion ruled that the constitutional clause
prohibited the states from freeing fugitive slaves.80 The majority found that,
because the federal law was based on a specific constitutional provision,
national in scope, the federal power over the provision was exclusive.81
Further, the Court found it inconsistent to state that federal power was

68. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 609; see also FINKELMAN, supra note 48, at 134 (“One of the blacks
Edward Prigg took to Maryland had been conceived and born in Pennsylvania ‘more than a year
after the said negro woman had fled and escaped from Maryland.’” (quoting Prigg, 41 U.S. at
609)).
69. Finkelman, Prigg, supra note 12, at 611–12.
70. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 608.
71. Finkelman, Prigg, supra note 12, at 605.
72. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 609.
73. Id.
74. TALBOT, supra note 65, at 29.
75. JANE H. PEASE & WILLIAM H. PEASE, THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW AND ANTHONY
BURNS: A PROBLEM IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 5 (Harold M. Hyman ed., 1975).
76. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 586; PEASE & PEASE, supra note 35, at 5.
77. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 598.
78. Id.
79. Finkelman, John McLean, supra note 12, at 543.
80. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 622.
81. Id.
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exclusive, but then order the states to carry out the federal law.82 Therefore,
the federal government was “bound, through its own proper departments,
legislative, judicial, or executive, as the case may require, to carry into effect
all the rights and duties imposed upon it by the Constitution.”83 Although the
Court believed that state judges should execute the federal law, it recognized
that the federal government had no power to require them to do so.84 The
Court did recognize, however, that, in certain instances, the States could
“regulate and remove fugitive slaves from their borders” under the police
power.85
The disjointed holdings in Prigg encouraged opposition, which resulted in
continuing disparities in the application of the law in different states.86 For
example, northern states continued to pass personal liberty laws in opposition
to the Supreme Court’s decision.87 Prohibitive personal liberty laws were
passed in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and
Vermont.88 After Prigg, “Northern resistance led to Southern demands for a
more effective federal statute.”89 Because the Prigg Court held that mandatory
state administration of the Fugitive Slave Act was unconstitutional, there were
demands for the creation of a federal body to exercise authority over the return
of fugitive slaves.90 Consequently, Congress passed the 1850 Fugitive Slave
Act (1850 Act).91 The 1850 Act provided for the appointment of a federal
body to administer the system, a procedure for the deportation of slaves (that
included the issuance of search and arrest warrants), the issuance of certificates
of removal, the imposition of fines for interference, and the deputization of
citizens to help with the administration of the system.92
Under the 1850 Act, Congress authorized federal judges to appoint
commissioners with “‘the powers that any justice of the peace or other
magistrate of any of the United States’ had to arrest, imprison, or bail offenders

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 615–16.
Id. at 616.
Id. at 615–16.
KANSTROOM, supra note 13, at 79.
See STANLEY W. CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT OF THE FUGITIVE
SLAVE LAW, 1850–1860, at 14 (1970).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony, supra note 12, at 1035.
90. Id.
91. See Act of September 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462; Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony,
supra note 12, at 1035.
92. Act of September 18, 1850, §§ 1, 5–7, 9 Stat. at 462–64. Section 1 stated that the
federal government may “exercise the power that any justice of the peace, or other magistrate of
any of the United States, may exercise in respect to offenders for any crime or offense against the
United States by arresting, imprisoning, or bailing” by the same virtue as judicial courts of the
United States. Id. § 1.
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of any crime against the United States.”93 Judges appointed commissioners94
in each federal circuit95 and granted them “concurrent jurisdiction with district
and circuit court judges over fugitive slave claims.”96 With these grants of
authority, commissioners could issue certificates of removal to claimants upon
satisfactory proof that a person was a fugitive slave.97 It was believed that the
commissioners, unlike state officials, would be unbiased in their application of
the Fugitive Slave Acts.98 Many federal agents enforced the return of fugitive
slaves.99 Slave owners went to the appropriate court in their home state to
initiate the removal process.100 In state court, the slave owner would have to
“establish that his slave had escaped and owed the owner service or labor.”101
The slave owner also “had to provide a general description of the fugitive.”102
During these proceedings,
[i]f the judge of the local court was satisfied that the first two points
were correct, . . . an official transcript was given to the claimant.
The transcript, when presented to a fugitive slave commissioner . . . ,
was to be received as conclusive evidence that the slave described in

93. Id. § 1. These “[c]ommissioners . . . were . . . appointed by the superior court of each
territory where ‘reasonable facilities to reclaim fugitives from labor’ were to be maintained.”
CAMPBELL, supra note 86, at 24 (quoting Act of 1850, § 3, 9 Stat. at 462).
94. Lindquist, supra note 32, at 4 (noting that U.S. Commissioners were “[c]reated
primarily in response to the state’s unwillingness to enforce unpopular federal laws in the early
nineteenth century, the commissioner performs judicial functions for the federal government that
are somewhat analogous to those performed by local magistrates or justices of the peace for the
states”). When Congress enacted the 1789 Judiciary Act, there was not a clear delineation
between federal and state jurisdiction. Id. Initially, many National Republicans believed that
state courts could perform federal functions. Id. at 5. In response, “Congress authorized the
circuit courts on February 20, 1812 ‘to appoint such and so many discreet persons, in different
parts of the district, as such court shall deem necessary, to take acknowledgements of bail and
affidavits.’ These ‘discrete persons’ . . . were customarily referred to as ‘commissioners of the
circuit court.’” Id. at 5–6 (footnotes omitted) (citing 1 Stat. 680–81, 682 (1812)).
95. Cloud, supra note 30, at 413.
96. Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, §§ 3–4, 9 Stat. 462, 462).
97. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, § 4, 9 Stat. at 462; Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony, supra note 12,
at 1035–36 (citing Allen Johnson, The Constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Acts, 31 YALE L.J.
161, 181–82 (1921)); see also CAMPBELL, supra note 86, at 24 (“The jurisdiction of the
commissioners was to be concurrent with that of the circuit and district judges, and they had
authority to grant certificates for the return of fugitive slaves.”). The statute stated specifically
that “the commissioners . . . shall grant certificates to such claimants, upon satisfactory proof
being made, with authority to take and remove such fugitives from service or labor . . . to the
State or Territory from which such persons may have escaped or fled.” Act of Sept. 18, 1850, §
4, 9 Stat. at 462 (emphasis added).
98. Lindquist, supra note 32, at 7–8.
99. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 75, at 11.
100. See CAMPBELL, supra note 86, at 113 (outlining the procedure for reclaiming a fugitive
slave).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 113–14.
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the transcript had escaped and owed service or labor to the
claimant.103
Fugitive slaves were not entitled to any rights during these proceedings.104
Frequently, slaves were denied the “right to a jury trial, the right of the accused
to testify in his own behalf, and the right to habeas corpus.”105 For example,
congruent with the 1850 Act, statutes in South Carolina and Georgia provided
“that the burden of legal proof was on free blacks to show that they were not
slaves.”106 Despite their efforts, the free states were unable to provide alleged
slaves with any protection because of the free states’ non-existent legal rights
within the pro-slave states.107
The state or local court provided the transcript to the commissioners within
the federal district court and the commissioner would issue a warrant for the
fugitive slave’s arrest.108 The 1850 Act “empowered commissioners . . . , as
well as [federal] courts themselves, to issue certificates” of removal.109 The
commissioners could also appoint persons, such as state officials, to execute
warrants for the capture of fugitive slaves.110
Once the warrants were issued for capture,
[t]he law charged federal marshals and their deputies to execute all
warrants for the arrest of alleged fugitives issued by the
commissioners and the courts and to be financially accountable
should the fugitives escape. In pursuance of their duties, the
marshals were authorized to summon and call to their aid the
bystanders . . . [b]ut, should the claimant so prefer, he might seize a
fugitive on his own responsibility without a warrant.111
Following the adoption and enforcement of the 1850 Act, “for the first time,
[the U.S. had] a large scale, relatively efficient federal system for the forced
removal of people from one place to another on the basis of rather scanty
proof, with minimal or no judicial oversight, and with only the most flimsy

103. Id. at 114.
104. See Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony, supra note 12, at 1036 (noting that fugitive slaves
were prohibited from entering evidence).
105. Id. at 1038; see also PEASE & PEASE, supra note 75, at 12 (stating that there was no
provision for habeas corpus under the Fugitive Slave Act); id. at 11–12 (“At no time during this
process was the alleged fugitive allowed to testify in his own behalf.”); Kaczorowski, The Tragic
Irony, supra note 12, at 1038 (“[C]ombined with the summary nature of the proceeding based
exclusively on the claimant’s evidence relating to the alleged fugitive’s status, [this] effectively
prevented the free states’ presumption of freedom and other personal liberty guarantees from
interfering with the slaveholder’s right of reception.”).
106. MORRIS, supra note 19, at 2, 11.
107. Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony, supra note 12, at 1038.
108. CAMPBELL, supra note 86, at 114.
109. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 35, at 11.
110. Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, §§ 2, 5, 9 Stat. 462, 462–63.
111. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 35, at 11; see also Act of Sept. 18, 1850, § 5, 9 Stat. at 463.

934

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 61:921

constitutional protections.”112 The underlying flaw with the 1850 Act was that
it created a federal enforcement mechanism that allowed the preferences of
slave-holding states to override those of the free states.113 The delegation itself
was not problematic; rather, more troublesome was the federal preference to
enforce a system that did not recognize what we now know as equal protection
or individual liberty interests of the slaves.
D. The Impact of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Reconstruction Clause on the
Fugitive Slave Acts and Early Immigration Law
After passage of the Reconstruction Amendments, the states no longer had
supreme authority over the forced migration of African American slaves.114
Instead, they were required to treat all persons equally under the law.115
Following the Dred Scott decision and passage of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Reconstruction radically changed the federal-state balance.116
At the time that Congress and the States passed the 1850 Act and personal
liberty laws, there were numerous questions surrounding the boundaries of
state sovereignty in relation to the federal government.117 States saw it within
their authority to invoke their police power to control migration at a state
level.118 For the first one hundred years of the country’s existence, states
heavily regulated immigration.119 Many states had their own naturalization
and immigration laws120 and laws were passed to protect states from
112. KANSTROOM, supra note 13, at 82 (“Three presidential successive
administrations—those of Fillmore, Pierce, and Buchanan—enforced the laws vigorously.”).
113. Id. at 80–81.
114. Donald G. Nieman, From Slaves to Citizens: African-Americans, Rights Consciousness,
and Reconstruction, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2115, 2115–16 (1996) (“Even most antislavery
politicians admitted that the Constitution denied the federal government authority to interfere
with slavery in any state that chose to sanction it.”).
115. Douglas L. Colbert, Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
1, 8 (1995) (footnotes omitted) (“States’ rights advocates knew that granting freedom meant
much more than a simple exemption from personal servitude. They argued that freedom for
African Americans would mean the right to participate in government and to enjoy the rights of
citizenship. They fully appreciated that abolishing slavery would make African Americans their
equals before the law.”).
116. Nieman, supra note 114, at 2116–17.
117. Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 81–83
(2002).
118. GERALD NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 19 (1996); Chin, supra note 17,
at 7.
119. Chin, supra note 17, at 7 (“States regulated entry of immigrants, particularly in major
seaports like New York and later San Francisco, but once the newcomer had successfully landed,
he or she was in. There were no green cards, no quotas, no caps, no Border Patrol or ICE
[Immigration and Customs Enforcement]. And there was no deportation.”).
120. In the 1790 Naturalization Act, Congress required state courts to record applications for
citizenship. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103. Further, states had to transmit
abstracts of citizenship applications and other naturalization records to the Secretary of State. Act
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undesirable classes of immigrants.121 These laws applied to immigrants as
well as to citizens of other states.122
The 1857 Dred Scott decision denied the possibility of citizenship to all
slaves, ex-slaves, and descendants of slaves and also prevented Congress from
prohibiting slavery in the territories.123 This case “‘made freedom local’ and
‘it made slavery national, in the sense that slavery would be legal in any part of
the United States where a state government had not abolished it.’”124 In 1868,
Congress passed the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, which
effectively overturned Dred Scott, thus providing citizenship for all African
Americans.125
The Reconstruction Amendments made slavery unconstitutional and, in
During the Fourteenth
principle, ensured equality under the law.126
Amendment’s passage, Republican senators argued that freed slaves should
have the full and equal benefits of the law.127 The fear was that failure to
guarantee equal protection could place the “ex-slave . . . in a social limbo” and
create tiered citizenship.128
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, on its face, ensures
that all persons are equal under the law.129 Federal immigration law, however,
emerged as an exception to this general rule. Racial discrimination of Chinese
immigrants challenged the Amendment’s boundaries in California.130
California’s legislature, after having numerous taxes targeted at Chinese
immigrants struck down as unconstitutional, switched tactics and passed laws
in the 1870s under their police power, focusing on character and conduct.131 In
actuality, the laws targeted Chinese women and the alleged goal was to keep
lewd women from migrating into the state.132
of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, § 2, 1 Stat. 566, 567. States also had to register aliens seeking
naturalization and issue certificates of registry. Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 2, 2 Stat. 153,
154–55; see also NEUMAN, supra note 118, at 19–20.
121. NEUMAN, supra note 118, at 19–20.
122. Abrams, Polygamy, supra note 9, at 665 (citing NEUMAN, supra note 118, at 20).
123. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404–05 (1857), superseded by U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
124. FINKELMAN, supra note 48, at 315 (quoting DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS,
1848–1861, at 293 (1976)).
125. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII & XIV.
126. John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original Understanding of “Equal Protection of
the Laws,” 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 135–36 (1950).
127. Id. at 134–35.
128. Id. at 133–34 (comparing the potential differentiations to India’s caste system).
129. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
130. Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A
“Magic Mirror” into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1122–23 (1998); see also
Abrams, Polygamy, supra note 9, at 682–89 (discussing California immigration law).
131. Abrams, Polygamy, supra note 9, at 672–77.
132. Id. at 674–76; see also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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State regulation of immigration faltered in In re Ah Fong when a California
district court found a California statute regulating the immigration of Chinese
women unconstitutional.133 Circuit Justice Field posited that states could not
exercise state police powers for “corrupt uses,” such as discrimination against
free blacks.134 Justice Field indicated that previous state police powers were
premised upon the institution of slavery and the exclusion of black slaves.135
In the wake of the Civil War, he stated that “no such power would be asserted,
or if asserted, allowed, in any federal court.”136 With the emancipation of
slaves, states shifted their use of police power from a pretext for discriminating
against African Americans to a pretext for the discrimination of Chinese
immigrants. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, this was as an invalid exercise
of a state’s police power.137 Justice Field remarked that if Chinese migration
“is to be stopped, recourse must be had to the federal government, where the
whole power over this subject lies.”138
Rather than striking down state discriminatory laws against immigrants, the
federal government passed similar laws.139 At the time, the equal protection
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment were not applicable to the federal
government.140 The Chinese exclusion laws of the 1880s marked the federal
government’s entrance into prominent regulation of immigration.141 These
laws were passed in reaction to the economic depression in California and
concerns over Chinese laborers taking jobs away from native-born
Americans.142
The two main cases challenging the Chinese exclusion laws were Chae
Chan Ping v. United States143 and Fong Yue Ting v. United States.144 In Chae,
the Court “held that a returning resident non-citizen could be excluded if
133. In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. 213, 216 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874) (No. 102).
134. Abrams, Polygamy, supra note 9, at 688 (citing Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. at 216–17).
135. Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. at 216–17.
136. Id. at 217.
137. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
138. Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. at 217.
139. Abrams, Polygamy, supra note 9, at 705–06.
140. Id. at 703–04. It was not until 1954 that the Equal Protection Clause was applied to the
federal government by incorporation into the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 703 n.317 (citing Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954)).
141. Chin, supra note 17, at 7 (“Anxiety over Asian immigration led the federal government
to assume regulatory authority over immigration.”). But see Abrams, Polygamy, supra note 9, at
645 (arguing for the inclusion of the 1875 Page law, which excluded Chinese women from
migrating to the country, as marking the federal government’s entrance into the regulation of
immigration); Cleveland, supra note 117, at 106 (stating that Congress did not pass a major
immigration law until 1875).
142. Chin, supra note 17, at 8. “[M]any Chinese immigrants were miners, manual laborers,
[and] laundrymen” and were viewed as a threat to American jobs. Id. at 9.
143. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 589 (1889).
144. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893); see also Chin, supra note
17, at 7 (discussing both cases).
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Congress determined that his race was undesirable—or for any other
reason.”145 Thus, the Court upheld a federal statute that prohibited unskilled
migratory workers of Chinese descent from migrating to and remaining in the
United States.146 Although this result is not incongruent with the modern
understanding of constitutional equal protection,147 the Supreme Court found
that Congress and the executive branch had plenary powers over immigration
and believed that the judiciary should not intervene at the time.148 Moreover, in
Fong, the Court determined
[d]eportation or exclusion of aliens “may be exercised entirely
through executive officers; or Congress may call in the aid of the
judiciary to ascertain any contested facts.” Imposing the burden of
proof on the Chinese person, and providing for testimony of white
witnesses only “is within the acknowledged power of every
legislature to prescribe the evidence which shall be received, and the
effect of that evidence, in the courts of its own government.”149
Chae sustained Congress’s plenary power over immigration,150 whereas
Fong affirmed congressional power to pass deportation statutes excluding
non-citizens based on race or for any other reason.151 Both cases affirmed that
federal immigration power superseded the equal protection rights of
immigrants.152
Here, we see the affirmation of the federal government’s exclusive power
over immigration, even in upholding racial exclusionary policies. This is
evident despite that, under equal protection norms, state discrimination against
non-citizens receives greater scrutiny.153 Once the Court chose to uphold
federal immigration laws, equal protection norms were not given much
attention.154
States’ use of police powers to exclude Chinese immigrants declined as
southern states lost the ability to use police powers to control the migration of
free African Americans155 and an increase of federal laws aimed at excluding
145. Chin, supra note 17, at 7; see also Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.
146. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 589, 611.
147. See Chin, supra note 17, at 15.
148. See Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609.
149. Chin, supra note 17, at 19 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 714,
729).
150. Id. at 7.
151. Id.
152. But see United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898) (finding that, under
the Fourteenth Amendment, a child born in America to Chinese parents was a U.S. citizen).
153. Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration
Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1361 (1999).
154. Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Aliens with Guns: Equal Protection, Federal Power, and the
Second Amendment, 92 IOWA L. REV. 891, 939–41 (2007) (discussing other instances of
constitutional conflict).
155. Abrams, Polygamy, supra note 9, at 673.
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Chinese immigrants replaced unconstitutional state attempts.156 If a person
was in the country unlawfully, the violation gave the federal government the
right to devalue a Chinese immigrant as a person and exploit his or her
willingness to work at no cost. Thus, the federal immigration system’s early
foundation, instead of striking down discriminatory state immigration laws,
simply moved discriminatory laws to the federal level where they continued
against Chinese immigrants.
In analyzing federal power over immigration, a commentator noted that
[i]t was no coincidence that greater legal freedoms for African
Americans were tied to Chinese misfortunes. As one historian
observed, “[w]ith Negro slavery a dead issue after 1865, greater
attention was focused [on immigration from China].” Political forces
quickly reacted to fill the racial void in the political arena. In
California, partisan political concerns, along with labor unionism, in
the post-Civil War period figured prominently in the anti-Chinese
movement.157
The Supreme Court explored the relationship between the treatment of
African Americans and other racial minorities in Plessy v. Ferguson.158 Justice
Harlan, dissenting from the “separate but equal” holding,159 made the first
declaration that “[o]ur Constitution is color-blind.”160 He also noted the irony
that the “separate but equal” doctrine applied to blacks, who unquestionably
were part of the political community, but not Chinese immigrants, “a race so
different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become
citizens of the United States” and who generally are excluded from entering
the country.161 Justice Harlan, although promoting legal equality for citizens,
continued to display a strong racial bias.162

156. See id. at 690–98 (discussing other legislation passed by Congress in the 1870s).
157. Johnson, supra note 130, at 1123 (1998) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)
(quoting STUART CREIGHTON MILLER, THE UNWELCOME IMMIGRANT 151 (1969)); see also
Abrams, Polygamy, supra note 9, at 652 (stating that the “prevailing viewpoint was that Chinese
laborers were effectively slaves” during the 1870s).
158. Plessy v. Fergusson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
159. Id. at 552.
160. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
161. Johnson, supra note 130, at 1124 (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 561 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
162. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in
prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the
principles of constitutional liberty.
Id.
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II. IMMIGRATION: A STORY OF FAILED FEDERALISM
A. Parallel Stories of the Failure of Federalism
The 1850 Fugitive Slave Act is analogous to current immigration
enforcement laws and policies in terms of federal supremacy and congressional
deference—both demonstrate the failure of federalism. In the case of fugitive
slaves, the states could not agree and the federal government was relatively
powerless to enforce the desires of the southern states until 1850. The
underlying problem, of course, was a fundamental disagreement about the
meaning of personhood and citizenship. The southern states felt quite
comfortable abusing African Americans’ rights because they strongly believed
that slaves were property and they were not intended to become citizens.163
The fundamental disagreement with the northern states on this issue made
political compromise impossible.164
The immigration story is an example of reverse-federalism. States are
currently frustrated by the federal government’s relative inaction on the
immigration front.165 Accordingly, states like Alabama, Arizona, Utah, and
Georgia have begun enacting their own immigration laws.166 The state
immigration laws will have a significant impact on immigrant rights. This
section examines the reverse federalism story and the extent to which current
federal immigration enforcement policy reinforces state and local actors
enacting their own immigration laws against both citizen and noncitizens’
rights—especially those who look or sound foreign.
Similar to the time when the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act was enacted, there is
currently a conflict amongst states and localities about how to address
immigrants within their communities.167 Recently, various states and localities
have enacted laws targeting immigrants while others have enacted laws that
give sanctuary to immigrants within their communities. 168
163. Johnson, supra note 97, at 178–80 (discussing the southern notion that slaves were less
than citizens and thus had no due process rights when seized in the North).
164. Id. at 179.
165. Letter from Governor Janice Brewer to President Barack Obama (June 23, 2010),
available at http://www.azgovernor.gov/dms/upload/PR_062410_LettertoPresidentObama.pdf;
Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, 2010 Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in the
States
(Jan.
1–Dec.
31,
2010),
NCSL
(Jan.
5,
2011),
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/2010-immigration-related-laws-and-resolutions-int.aspx.
166. See, e.g., Common Threat Present in Immigration Law Challenges, CNN (June 28,
2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/06/28/immigration.laws/index.html.
167. Karla Mari McKanders, Constitutionality of State and Local Laws Targeting
Immigrants, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 579, 585 (2009).
168. Id. (“There are a multitude of state and local laws that target immigrants. For instance,
some states and localities have passed ‘pro-immigrant’ laws encouraging immigration to their
states, while others have passed ‘anti-immigrant’ laws that primarily deny immigrants essential
services to force immigrants to leave the states and cities.”).
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When discussing federal authority over immigration, most dialogues start
with the proposition that immigration went largely unregulated until the federal
government first exerted authority over immigration in the early twentieth
Discussions related to federal supremacy in the area of
century.169
immigration are often based on the plenary powers doctrine to justify federal
control over immigration without a detailed examination of the historical
underpinnings of the federal immigration system.170
Recently, immigration scholars have focused on the relationship between
federal, state, and local governments in regulating immigration.171 States and
localities claim that they should be able to use their Tenth Amendment police
powers to regulate immigrants within their borders, while the federal
government claims exclusivity in the area of immigration law and policy.172
One striking similarity between the Fugitive Slave Acts and current
immigration laws is that the 1850 Act created a unique federal law
enforcement institution that removed power from state and local hands.173 The
Thomas Sims case perfectly illustrates the parallel.174 Thomas Sims, a fugitive
slave, escaped to Massachusetts and began working.175 A few years later, his
former owner located him in Massachusetts and sought his return.176 The
former owner went through a commissioner to obtain a certificate of removal
and then sought to arrest Sims.177 Instead of using U.S. Marshals to enforce
the certificate of removal, the federal government deputized state and local
officials as federal agents to enforce the provisions of the 1850 Act.178 City
policemen were hastily sworn in as deputy federal marshals and effectuated the
arrest.179 They ignored the Massachusetts personal liberty law, which stated
that Massachusetts would not comply with the 1850 Act and return fugitive
slaves to slave states in the South.180 Despite the clash between federal and
Massachusetts law, Sims was returned to Georgia as a fugitive slave.181

169. Neuman, supra note 7, at 1833–35.
170. Id.
171. See generally Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C.
L. REV. 1619 (2008); see also sources collected supra note 3.
172. Laurel R. Boatright, “Clear Eye for the State Guy”: Clarifying Authority and Trusting
Federalism to Increase Nonfederal Assistance with Immigration Enforcement, 84 TEX. L. REV.
1633, 1653–54 (2006); Rodriguez, supra note 3, at 575.
173. Kaczorowski, Moral Anomaly, supra note 12, at 192–93.
174. PEASE & PEASE, supra note 35, at 18.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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B. States and Localities Take Action
Currently, states and localities argue that the federal government fails to
enforce existing federal law governing the removal of immigrants within their
borders.182 For example, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 287(a)
gives U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) the power to
interrogate any person believed to be a noncitizen regarding his or her right to
be present in the United States and to arrest noncitizens for violation of
immigration laws.183 Further, INA § 287(g) empowers the federal government
to enter into agreements with states and localities to apprehend and deport
undocumented immigrants.184 States and localities believe that the federal
government is not effectively implementing these types of federal provisions
and, as a result, have begun enacting their own laws that mimic § 287(a).185
1. Arizona: S.B. 1070
Arizona has perhaps the most controversial law, which overtly permits its
state and local law enforcement officials to exercise federal immigration
powers.186 In April 2010, Arizona passed S.B. 1070: The Support Our Law
Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act.187 Its purpose is to use state and
local government actors to target undocumented immigrants in order to
increase the attrition of undocumented immigrants out of the state.188
Under the law, any person who the police reasonably suspect of being an
undocumented immigrant may be subject to detention and questioning
regarding their immigration status.189 Section 2 requires officers to make a
reasonable attempt, when practicable, to determine an individual’s immigration
status during any lawful stop, detention, or arrest already effected.190 Section 2
also requires that all arrested persons have their immigration status determined
prior to release.191 Further, Section 2 describes who may verify immigration
statuses and lists documents that create a presumption of lawful presence.192

182. Rodriguez, supra note 3, at 570, 575.
183. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (2006).
184. Id. § 1357(g).
185. Rodriguez, supra note 3, at 570, 575.
186. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 165 (“Bills similar to Arizona’s were
subsequently introduced in six state legislatures—Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, South Carolina,
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island—but none were enacted.”).
187. S.B. 1070, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450 (codified in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. (2011)).
188. S.B. 1070, Sec. 1, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450, 450 (“The provisions of this act are
intended to work together to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and
economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United States.”).
189. S.B. 1070, Sec. 2, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws at 451.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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These provisions closely resemble the federal immigration powers of INA
§ 287(a).193
Section 3 of S.B. 1070 criminalizes the failure to carry an alien registration
document at the state level.194 Section 3 provides that “a person is guilty of
willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document if the person
is in violation of” 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) or § 1306(a), which are analogous federal
statutes.195 A first offense is a class one misdemeanor, punishable by up to
twenty days of incarceration and up to a $100 fine.196 The second offense is
punishable by up to thirty days of jail time.197
The Arizona law was challenged in United States v. Arizona198 and Friendly
House v. Whiting.199 The Whiting lawsuit alleged that S.B. 1070 interferes
with federal immigration law in violation of the Supremacy Clause, causes
racial profiling in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and violates the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.200 One of the plaintiffs, Jim
Shee, is an American citizen of Spanish and Chinese descent and is fluent in
Spanish.201 Despite having lived in Arizona his entire life, he alleges that the
police have racially profiled him twice in a single month and asked him to
produce his citizenship papers.202 Shee fears that the bill’s implementation
would increase the incidence of these frustrating situations.203 Recently, in
United States v. Arizona, in June 2012, the Supreme Court struck down the
Arizona law as constitutionally preempted with the exception of section 2,
which requires the police to check the immigration status of persons whom
they detain before releasing them. The Court found that the law’s mandate for
state and local police offers to make reasonable attempts to determine the
immigration status of a detained person does not interfere with federal
immigration laws.204
193. Compare id., with 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (2006).
194. S.B. 1070, Sec. 3, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws at 453–55.
195. Id.
196. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-509(H) (Supp. 2011). The original penalties in S.B.
1070 were harsher than those codified, but H.B. 2162 lessened these penalties. H.B. 2162, 2010
Ariz. Sess. Laws 1070, 1076 (codified in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. (2011)).
197. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-509(H).
198. 70 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, and remanded, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
199. Complaint, Friendly House v. Whiting, No. CV 10-1061 (D. Ariz. May 17, 2010), 2010
WL 2019492. On September 5, 2012, Judge Susan R. Bolton denied the specifc part of the
plaintiffs’ motion to enjoin the enforcement of subsection 2(B) of Arizona law S.B. 1070. Valle
del
Sol
v.
Whiting,
No.
CV
10-1061
(D.
Ariz.
Sept.
5,
2012),
http://nilc.org/sb1070friendlyhouse.html.
200. Complaint, supra, note 199, at 6.
201. Id. at 21.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
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2. Alabama: House Bill 56
More recently, Alabama passed House Bill 56, the Beason-Hammon
Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act.205 Opponents of the bill claim
that Alabama Governor Robert Bentley “touted HB 56 as ‘the strongest
immigration bill in the country’ and a co-sponsor of the bill boasted that it
regulates ‘every aspect of a person’s life.’”206 The ACLU alleges that H.B. 56
is “[a] shocking throwback to the days of de jure segregation, [and] attempts to
make a class of individuals non-persons in the eyes of the law.”207
H.B. 56 asserts there is “a compelling public interest to discourage illegal
immigration by requiring all agencies within [Alabama] to fully cooperate with
federal immigration authorities in the enforcement of federal immigration
laws.”208 This law goes even further than Arizona’s, authorizing the Alabama
Department of Homeland Security to hire and maintain its own immigration
enforcement body.209 Like Arizona’s S.B. 1070, H.B. 56 Section 12(a)
requires a law enforcement officer to make a reasonable attempt to determine
the immigration status of a detained person when reasonable suspicion exists
that the person is an unlawful alien.210 Further, H.B. 56 Section 18 allows
police to detain persons found driving without a proper license for up to fortyeight hours to determine their immigration status.211 The most controversial
part of the statute requires an assessment of immigration status for every
student in Alabama public schools when the student enrolls.212
On July 8, 2011, the Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama filed a lawsuit
against the state alleging that federal immigration law preempts H.B. 56.213
Specifically, the complaint claims that:
HB 56 will subject Alabamians—including countless U.S. citizens
and non-citizens who have permission from the federal government
to remain in the United States—to unlawful interrogations, searches,
seizures, and arrests, and will result in racial profiling. This is
because HB 56 mandates law enforcement officers to investigate the
immigration status of any individual they stop, detain, or arrest when
205. H.R. H.B. 56, 2011 Leg. (Ala. 2011).
206. Complaint at 2, Hispanic Interest Coal. Of Ala. V. Bentley, No. 5:11-cv-2428-SLB,
2011 WL 5516953 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2011).
207. Am. Civil Liberties Union Found. Immigration Rights Project, Preliminary Analysis of
HB
56,
“Alabama
Taxpayer
and
Citizen
Protection
Act”,
ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/prelimanalysis_alabama_hb56_0.pdf (last visited May 28,
2012).
208. H.R. H.B. 56 § 2, 2011 (Ala. 2011).
209. Id. § 22.
210. Id. § 12(a).
211. Id. § 18.
212. Id. § 28.
213. Complaint, supra note 206, at 3 (stating that “[a]mong other constitutional defects, HB
56 is preempted in its entirety because it encroaches on exclusively federal immigration authority
and because it conflicts with federal law in multiple ways”).
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they have “reasonable suspicion” that the individual lacks
immigration status. Individuals who may be perceived as “foreign”
by state or local law enforcement agents will be in constant jeopardy
of harassment and unlawfully prolonged detention and arrest by state
law enforcement officers operating under HB 56’s new immigration
enforcement mandates. And all Alabamians will be required to carry
state-approved identity documentation in order to prevent lengthy
investigations as to their status.214
Like the Supreme Court in the Arizona case, the district court judge refused
to enjoin Section 12 of the Act, which requires state and local law enforcement
officials to try to verify a person’s immigration status during routine traffic
stops or arrests.215 The court also denied the injunction of Section 10, which
criminalized the willful failure of a person in the country illegally to carry
federal immigration papers, because the sections were not preempted by
federal law.216 Like the laws that violated the rights of fugitive slaves,
Alabama’s law is reminiscent of “pervasive and systematic targeting of a class
of persons through punitive state laws that seek to render every aspect of daily
life more difficult and less equal.”217
3. Georgia’s Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act
Another timely example is the Georgia Illegal Immigration Reform and
Enforcement Act of 2011.218 The statute provides criminal sanctions for
identity fraud219 and transporting220 or harboring an illegal alien.221 The status
also contains provisions similar to the Act of 1850, broadly allowing certain
federal documents and oral testimony to summarily establish a person’s
unlawful status.222 The law further provides that during an investigation, upon
probable cause, state and local police officers may

214. Id. (citations omitted).
215. Hispanic Interest Coal. of Ala. v. Bentley, No. 5:11-CV-02484-SLB, 2011 WL
5516953, at *36–37 (N.D. Ala. July 8, 2011).
216. Id. at *24–26.
217. Complaint, supra note 206, at 3.
218. Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act, H.B. 87, 2011 Ga. Laws 794
(codified in scattered sections of GA. CODE ANN. (West 2011)).
219. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-121.1 (Supp. 2011).
220. Id. § 16-11-200.
221. Id. § 16-11-201.
222. Id. § 16-11-203 (“The testimony of any officer, employee, or agent of the federal
government having confirmed that a person is an illegal alien shall be admissible to prove that the
federal government has verified such person to be present in the United States in violation of
federal immigration law. Verification that a person is present in the United States in violation of
federal immigration law may also be established by any document authorized by law to be
recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public office where items of this nature are
kept.”).
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verify such suspect’s immigration status when the suspect is unable
to provide one of the following: (1) A secure and verifiable
document as defined in [the Georgia law]; (2) A valid Georgia
driver’s license; (3) A valid Georgia identification card issued by the
Department of Driver Services; (4) If the entity requires proof of
legal presence in the United States before issuance, any valid driver’s
license from a state or district of the United States or any valid
identification document issued by the United States federal
government; . . . (6) Other information as to the suspect’s identity
that is sufficient to allow the peace officer to independently identify
the suspect.223
Like the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act, this law empowers the state to exercise
federal enforcement powers.224
Similar to the Arizona and Alabama laws, the Georgia law was challenged in
Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal.225 The lawsuit alleged that
the Georgia statute violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses by
unlawfully discriminating against people based on national origin.226 The
plaintiff, Jaypaul Singh, is a U.S. citizen of South Asian descent, who
permanently resides in Washington state.227 Singh, a law student, spends
summers in Atlanta as a law clerk.228 He has a Washington driver’s license,
but that state does not determine an applicant’s immigration status before
issuing a license.229 Thus, his license is insufficient to verify his immigration
status under the new Georgia law.230 Singh fears that he might be subjected to
a long detention while police try to ascertain his immigration status.231
4. Utah: H.B. 497
In Utah, the recently passed H.B. 497 requires state and local law
enforcement officers to verify the immigration or citizenship status of
individuals they encounter who are unlawfully present in the United States.232
Plaintiffs in Utah Coalition of LaRaza v. Herbert alleged that the statute
violates the Equal Protection Clause because it encourages racial profiling of

223. Id. § 17-5-100.
224. See supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text.
225. 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded,
691 F.3d 1250 (11th cir. 2012).
226. Id. at 1338–39.
227. Complaint at 31, Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (No. 1:11-CV-1804-TWT).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 31–32.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 32.
232. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-9-1001 to 76-9-1009 and 77-7-2 (Supp. 2011).
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Latinos and anyone who looks or sounds foreign.233 Similar to the Arizona
and Georgia profiling stories, one plaintiff, Milton Ivan Salazar-Gomez, is a
resident of Salt Lake City, Utah, and fears that he will be subject to racial
profiling.234 Although he has lived in the United States for nearly his entire
life, he is a Mexican national whose parents brought him to the United States
when he was ten months old.235 Salazar-Gomez was stopped for driving with
expired tags and turned over to federal immigration officials.236 Following two
months of detainment, he was released and now fears that he might be stopped
and harassed during the pendency of his removal proceedings.237
C. State Laws Demonstrate a Failure of Federalism
The Arizona, Alabama, Georgia, and Utah laws mirror INA § 287(a), which
provides federal officers the right to interrogate persons believed to be in the
United States without authorization.238 Reminiscent of personal liberty
laws,239 states claim they are inclined to pass anti-immigrant laws because the
federal government is not taking action to remedy unauthorized
immigration.240 Both the Fugitive Slave Acts and current state immigration
laws demonstrate the failure of federalism. The underlying problem in both
cases is a fundamental disagreement couched in terms of federalism that pits
states’ powers against citizens’ civil rights.241 The current passage of state
immigration laws represents reverse-federalism. States like Alabama, Arizona,
Utah, and Georgia are responding to federal inaction and are enacting their
own immigration laws, whereas the era of the 1850 Act witnessed the federal
government taking supreme authority over the regulation of fugitive slaves.

233. Complaint at 5, Utah Coal. of La Raza v. Herbert, No. 2:11-CV-401-CW, 2011 WL
7143098 (D. Utah May 11, 2011).
234. Id. at 14–15.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 15.
237. Id.
238. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (2006); Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Takes Up Arizona’s Strict
Immigration Law, ABC NEWS (Dec. 12, 2011, 10:53 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs
/politics/2011/12/Supreme.court.takes.up.arizonas.strict.immigration.law./.
239. See supra Part I.B.
240. Lynn Tramonte, Debunking the Myth of “Sanctuary Cities”, IMMIGRATION POLICY
CTR. (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/debunking-myth
-sanctuary-cities (“Historically, the federal government has enforced civil immigration law, and
state and local police have focused on enforcing criminal law. However, propelled by increased
frustration with the nation’s broken immigration system and by growing anti-immigrant
sentiment, politicians’ demands for state and local police to take an increased role in immigration
enforcement have grown exponentially. This culminated in the passage of Arizona’s notorious
SB 1070 [sic] law in 2010, which would turn Arizona state and local police officers into
deportation agents.”).
241. Editorial, The Nation’s Cruelest Immigration Law, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/29/opinion/the-nations-cruelest-immigration-law.html.
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III. THE FUGITIVE SLAVE ACTS AND CURRENT IMMIGRATION LAWS CREATE
OUTSIDERS
A. Racial Profiling and the Presumption of Illegality Against Fugitive Slaves
and Immigrants
State enforcement of federal immigration laws often leads to racial profiling.
This practice, a presumption of illegality based on racial identity,242 is
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable
It is also inconsistent with the Fourteenth
searches and seizures.243
Amendment’s equal protection guarantees. The Department of Justice has
stated that racial profiling,
at its core[,] concerns the invidious use of race or ethnicity as a
criterion in conducting stops, searches, and other law enforcement
investigative procedures. It is premised on the erroneous assumption
that any particular individual or one race or ethnicity is more likely
to engage in misconduct than any particular individual of another
race or ethnicity.244
When law enforcement engages in profiling, there is “[n]o logical
relationship . . . between any of these characteristics and the commission of
crimes.”245 Yet, “[g]overnment agencies employ race-based enforcement
tactics without empirical proof of their success.”246
During enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Acts, courts held that
[i]n the case of a person visibly appearing to be a negro, the
presumption is, in this country, that he is a slave, and it is incumbent
on him to make out his right to freedom: but in the case of a person
visibly appearing to be a white man, or an Indian, the presumption is
that he is free, and it is necessary for his adversary to shew [sic] that
he is a slave.247
Thus, presumptions in the recovery of fugitive slaves are very similar to
current racial profiling.248 The legislation, which permitted slave owners to

242. Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The Consequences of
Racial Profiling After September 11, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1196 (2002).
243. Cloud, supra note 30, at 369.
244. Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Guidance Regarding the Use of Race
by
Federal
Law
Enforcement
Agencies
(June
2003),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/guidance_on_race.pdf.
245. Cloud, supra note 30, at 370.
246. Ashar, supra note 242, at 1196.
247. Cloud, supra note 30, at 402 (citing Hudgins. v. Wright, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134, 141
(1806)).
248. Id. at 371.
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capture any African American and impress him into servitude, was as racially
focused as today’s profiling.249
An example of the use of racial profiling in the enforcement of the 1850 Act
is illustrated in the story of Solomon Northrup, a free African American,250
who was captured by James H. Burch, a slave catcher and dealer.251 Northrup
was racially profiled, abducted, and incarcerated and did not did not know why
he was imprisoned, as he was never a slave.252 Scholar Larry Stokes explains
that
[a] White could fraudulently claim that a Black was a slave, and
there was very little that a Free Negro could do about it. There
always existed the danger of a free Black being kidnapped, as often
happened, and taken into slavery. A large majority of free Blacks
lived in daily fear of losing what freedom they had. One slip of
ignorance of the law would endanger their slight freedom and place
them into slavery.253
Anti-slavery activists pointed out the frequent occurrence of free African
American men and women being illegally enslaved.254
In recent state and federal immigration laws, there appears to be a similar
presumption of illegality that is applied to Latinos. For example, in United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court held that immigration officers
could use racial identifiers with other factors near the U.S. border.255
Immigration scholar Kevin Johnson critiqued this decision as authorizing the
racial profiling of Latinos.256 Just as Northrup was racially profiled as a slave
because he was African American, Brignoni allows the presumption that a
Latino with predominant Mesoamerican features near the border is
unauthorized.257
249. Larry D. Stokes, Legislative and Court Decisions That Promulgated Racial Profiling: A
Sociohistorical Perspective, 23 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 263, 268 (2007), available at
http://ccj.sagepub.com/content/23/3.toc.
250. Id. at 269; The Kidnapping Case. Narrative of the Seizure and Recovery of Solomon
Northrup. Interesting Disclosures. N.Y. DAILY TIMES, Jan. 20, 1853, at A1 [hereinafter The
Kidnapping Case] (stating that Northrup was “a free colored citizen of the United States; was
born in Essex County, New York, about the year 1808”).
251. The Kidnapping Case, supra note 250, at A1.
252. Stokes, supra note 249, at 269 (“This incident is a firsthand account of a free Black who
was racially profiled, captured, and placed into slavery.”).
253. Id.
254. Cloud, supra note 30, at 397. Between adversion to slavery and “fears that crude
standards of proof employed by slave catchers led to the enslavement of free blacks living in
Northern and border states,” the nation saw “resistance to enforcement of the federal law.” Id. at
371.
255. Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land:
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious
Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1007 (2010) (discussing Brignoni-Ponce).
256. Id.
257. Id.
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Renteria-Villegas v. Hall is demonstrative of the Latino presumption.258 The
Davidson County Sheriff’s Office of Nashville, Tennessee, detained Daniel
Renteria-Villegas, a 19-year-old Portland, Oregon-born man, twice within the
same month.259 During the first incident, even though the arrest report and
booking documents stated that Renteria-Villegas was born in Portland, Oregon,
he was placed on an “ICE hold.”260 The arresting officer, without asking,
recorded Renteria-Villegas’s place of birth as Mexico.261 Renteria-Villegas
was not released until his family presented officials with his passport and birth
certificate.262
These cases illustrate how racial profiling reinforces the unequal application
of the laws against certain populations. Lawful residents fear unlawful
detention based on criteria such as their race, ethnicity, or proximity to the
border. Racial profiling in enforcement may lead to denied access to counsel,
unlawful, prolonged detention without the bringing of charges, and denial of
substantive and procedural due process rights.263
B. Membership Within a State: Are Fugitive Slaves and Immigrants Chattel or
Humans?
Both the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act and current immigration policies have
inspired a debate that requires the American people to decide if human beings
who live and work among us are morally and legally equal to us. The purpose
of this comparison is to highlight similarities between the enforcement of
immigration laws and the Fugitive Slave Acts’ regulation of human labor.
This comparison demonstrates that immigration policies should be instituted
based on norms that recognize the personhood and humanity of the subjects of
the law. The key connection between the Fugitive Slave Acts and current
migration policies is the ways in which immigration law and policy have
facilitated dehumanization and created a quasi-citizen worker.
The most significant parallel between the Fugitive Slave Acts and the
current deportation regime is the unjust treatment of human subjects in the
course of using cheap labor to maximize profit. Slaves were treated as chattel
property and forced into labor. They were counted as three-fifths of a person
for purposes of Congressional representation and received no protections under
the law.264 U.S. immigration policies have sought the benefit of migrant
258. Renteria-Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 796 F. Supp. 2d 900
(M.D. Tenn. 2011), motion to certify appeal denied, No. 3:11-00218, 2011 WL 2938428 (M.D.
Tenn. July 19, 2011).
259. Id. at 902.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Ashar, supra note 242, at 1197.
264. Becky Petit, Enumerating Inequality: The Constitution, the Census Bureau, and the
Criminal Justice System, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 37, 40 (2009) (“At the nation’s founding[,] the
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laborers separate from their value as persons.265 At times, our country’s
migration policies are executed in a manner in which people are seen as
machines that simply move levers.266 This approach has resulted in laws that
infringe on the personal liberties of target classes.267
three-fifths compromise required the consideration of slaves as three fifths of a free person for
apportionment” (citing MARGO J. ANDERSON & STEPHEN E. FIENBERG, WHO COUNTS?: THE
POLITICS OF CENSUS-TAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 14 (1999))).
265. Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented
Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955, 986 (1988) (“[E]ven where formal
rights exist, the ability of the undocumented to exercise these rights in practice is limited.
Undocumented aliens often fear exposing themselves to the exclusionary powers of the state and
will often forego the exercise of membership rights in order to avoid such an eventuality.
Undocumented immigrants commonly decline to report private or official abuse and are
frequently unwilling to pursue civil claims in court or to step forward to receive benefits to which
they are entitled.” (footnotes omitted)); Bravo, Free Labor, supra note 17, at 550 (“Individual
migrants, who comprise a significant source of trafficked persons, seek to exchange their labor
for value—to respond to market forces that promise higher prices for their labor across internal
domestic and/or international borders. Those borders are now heavily policed and enforced, and
unsanctioned crossing is essentially verboten. In seeking to trade their labor and to navigate the
state-created barriers (i.e., borders) to transnational labor markets, individuals become more
vulnerable to the predations of exploitative middlemen such as traffickers in human beings.”); see
also Beth Lyon, The Unsigned United Nations Worker Rights Convention: An Overlooked
Opportunity to Change the “Brown Collar” Migration Paradigm, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. 389, 393
(2010) (arguing for the United States to ratify the United Nations Convention to prompt
Americans to consider that immigrant workers should receive human rights protections).
266. Bill Ong Hing, Don’t Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor: Conflicted Immigrant Stories and
Welfare Reform, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 162 (1998) (“The costs for immigrants are
demonstrable and severe in terms of stigmatization, invasion of privacy, denial of a social and
employment safety net, and the lasting invalidation of their—and our—collective dreams for
progress and community.”); Kathleen Newland & Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Managing
International Migration: Tracking the Emergence of a New International Regime, 3 UCLA J.
INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 637, 650 (1998) (discussing “economic stream—employment- or
skills-based immigration” where immigration decisions “are based primarily on economic
considerations, such as the need for skilled workers, and calculations about the foreign workers’
effect on the jobs and income of citizens,” and noting further “[i]n recent years, this immigration
stream has become omnipresent across advanced industrial societies as globalization and the
imperatives of international competition combine to make many foreign workers, from highly
educated scientists to temporary agricultural workers, highly desirable.”).
267. Michelle Brané & Christina Lundholm, Human Rights Behind Bars: Advancing the
Rights of Immigration Detainees in the United States Through Human Rights Frameworks, 22
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 147, 147 (2008) (addressing the “urgent need for creative approaches in
upholding international human rights norms . . . and extending protection to those affected”);
Kevin R. Johnson, The End of “Civil Rights” as We Know It?: Immigration and Civil Rights in
the New Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1481, 1499 (2002) (“In sum, if history proves to be an
accurate guide, immigration and immigration enforcement will remain a civil rights trouble
spot.”); Lamar Smith & Edward R. Grant, Immigration Reform: Seeking the Right Reasons, 28
ST. MARY’S L.J. 883, 893–94 (1997) (discussing the need for immigration reform that accounts
for the basic human dignity of any person). See generally Kristina M. Oven, The Immigrant First
as Human: International Human Rights Principles and Catholic Doctrine as New Moral
Guidelines for U.S. Immigration Policy, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 499 (1999)
(highlighting the recent trend of laws that strip immigrants of their most basic human rights).
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This personless approach is reinforced when those who do not have
citizenship are denied the protection of the law.268 When a person does not fit
within membership in a polity, that person may be outside of state protection
of rights and can be subject to subordination and exploitation. In this context,
when people are divorced from their humanity, the policies surrounding their
migration perpetuate dehumanization. In the area of immigration law, scholars
such as Kevin Johnson and Linda Bosniak have critiqued how the immigration
system has continually perpetuated the subordination of marginalized
groups.269 Bosniak specifically critiques “progressive” scholarship in that it
“tends to normatively embrace the very national boundary which serves to
effect, and justify, the immigrants’ exclusion.”270 This context questions the
“‘national political imagination,’ one which regards the national community as
the predominant community of normative concern and presumes the
legitimacy, and perhaps the necessity of maintaining borders around it.”271
Thus, despite their contributions, immigrants’ individual rights are severely
restricted.272 Although there must be some form of immigration laws under
these theories, our country must examine and limit these laws to the extent that
they violate equal protection norms. One can accept some difference in the
law, but one cannot accept laws that blatantly violate equal protection norms.
There is a striking similarity in the regulation of both slaves and migrant
workers to low paying and low status jobs. Slaves performed jobs such as

268. LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY
MEMBERSHIP 1 (2006) (“The idea of citizenship is commonly invoked to convey a state of
democratic belonging or inclusion, yet this inclusion is usually premised on a conception of a
community that is bounded and exclusive. Citizenship as an ideal is understood to embody a
commitment against subordination, but citizenship can also represent an axis of subordination
itself.”); see also HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 70-79 (2006).
269. Bosniak, supra note 265, at 987 (“[T]he incidents of membership [the immigrant]
enjoys are severely circumscribed by [his or her] status as [an] outsider, constrained directly and
indirectly by the state’s exclusionary powers. The experience and identity of the undocumented
worker are thus defined along two matrices, exclusion and membership. It is this duality that has
characterized [his or her] existence in United States society.”); see also Devon W. Carbado,
Racial Naturalization, 57 AM. Q. 633, 641, 651 (2005) (“Race is implicated in naturalization not
only as a prerequisite—that is, as a basis for determining who gets to become an American
citizen. Race also determines the kind [social] status one occupies.”).
270. Linda S. Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187: Undocumented Immigrants and the National
Imagination, 28 CONN. L. REV. 555, 585, 578–79 (1996) (“[S]ubsuming alienage-based exclusion
into analyses of racial and cultural marginalization is problematic, not merely because not all
undocumented immigrants belong to ethnic and racial minority groups, but also because it fails to
capture what is specific about the exclusion experienced by undocumented immigrants, which is
constituted, in substantial part, by their irregular status under the country’s immigration laws.”
(footnotes omitted)); see also Johnson, supra note 130, at 1148.
271. Motomura, supra note 153, at 1376 (citing Bosniak, supra note 270, at 559).
272. McKanders, supra note 18, at 171.
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agricultural and household work.273
Today, both documented and
undocumented migratory workers are pigeonholed into low paying agriculture,
household, and construction jobs.274 In both positions, the law facilitates the
exploitation of the most vulnerable population.
The Reconstruction Amendments were intended to “abolish[] all class
legislation in the States and [do] away with the injustices of subjecting one
caste of persons to a code not applicable to another.”275 Similarly, when
immigration law and policy begin to recognize the humanity of the subjects of
the laws, there will be more equitable policies towards immigrants who come
to the United States as economic migrants. Most acknowledge that “[s]lavery
was a system of racial adjustment and social order.”276 So, too, is an
immigration regime that has the indirect effect of targeting the poorest
immigrants of color.
IV. CONCLUSION
Scholars caution “against creating simplistic solutions to contemporary
problems based on complex legal history.”277 The similarities between current
immigration policies and the Fugitive Slave Acts provide insight into current
enforcement policies and how federal policies should not follow the same
patterns that earlier failed to provide equal protection under the law. In both
instances, state and federal governments can enact oppressive laws that fail to
recognize the humanity of the subjects of the laws.
The Fugitive Slave Acts had no procedural protections for free blacks or
fugitive slaves.278 Further, the plenary powers doctrine was implemented in a
manner that, while reinforcing Congress’s ability to legislate immigration
matters, also supported the violation of Chinese migrant workers’ rights.
Historically, multiplying forces have widespread implications on immigrants’
equal protection rights. This is evident from the allegations in the Arizona,

273. Nicholas Boston, Slavery and the Making of America: The Slave Experience, Historical
Overview:
Living
Conditions,
PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/slavery/experience/living/history2.html (last visited May 28, 2012).
274. Wendy Williams, Model Enforcement of Wage and Hour Laws for Undocumented
Workers: One Step Closer to Equal Protection Under the Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
755, 756, 760 (2006).
275. Frank & Munro, supra note 126, at 141 (quoting Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
2459 (1866)).
276. MORRIS, supra note 19, at 2 (quoting ULRICH BONNELL PHILLIPS, THE COURSE OF THE
SOUTH TO SECESSION 152 (E. Merton Coulter, ed. 1939)).
277. Cloud, supra note 30, at 418; see also Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry?
Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493,
568 (2001) (concluding that Congress cannot “devolve by statute its exclusive immigration power
to the States”).
278. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 302, 302–05 (1845); Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch.
60, § 1, 9 Stat. 462, 462–65.
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Alabama, Georgia and Utah cases. Inevitably, having numerous states and
localities enforce immigration policies will lead to increased racial profiling.
Under the Fugitive Slave Acts, all basic rights of humanity were denied to
African Americans.
[B]lack slaves enjoyed no social status, no wealth, no political
influence in the North. This was as weak and disadvantaged a
minority as has ever lived in the nation. Whether free or slave, in the
decades preceding the Civil War blacks were a group particularly
vulnerable to profile based seizures.279
The unlawful Fugitive Slave Acts reinforced this caste-like system.
Current anti-immigration laws in several states and municipalities across the
country deny undocumented immigrants their humanity based upon their
unlawful entry into the United States or permitting their immigration status to
expire. Like the Fugitive Slave Acts, some state and local laws, such as those
in Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, and Utah, were intended to exclude people,
regardless of their immigration status, from formerly homogenous states, cities
and towns.280

279. Cloud, supra note 30, at 411.
280. Brief for the Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity, and Diversity at
University of California, Berkeley Law School as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellees, Supporting Affirmance at 5, Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d
477 (M.D. Pa. 2007) aff’d in part, vacated in part, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. granted,
judgment vacated sub. nom., 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011); see also Roberto Suro & Sonya Tafoya, The
New Latino South: The Context and Consequences of Rapid Population Growth, PEW HISPANIC
CTR., i (July 26, 2005), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/50.pdf (“[S]izeable Hispanic
populations have emerged suddenly in communities where Latinos were a sparse presence just a
decade or two ago.”).
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